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PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS AND
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT
A. Christopher Bryant*
Two thousand and six was the year of the presidential signing statement. This
constitutional cause c6lbre commenced on the penultimate day of 2005, when
President George W. Bush signed a defense appropriations bill into law and
simultaneously issued a signing statement cryptically declaring that the McCain
Amendment-a provision in the bill prohibiting "cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment" of any persons in U.S. custody anywhere'-would be construed "in a
manner consistent with the constitutional authority of the President to supervise the
unitary executive branch and as Commander in Chief... [in order to] protect[] the
American people from further terrorist attacks."2 What did this mean? In response
to press inquiries, senior administration officials confirmed that the purpose of the
language was to reserve the right to authorize harsher methods of interrogation in
situations concerning national security.' Thus, "never" became "maybe sometimes."4
Professor Marty Lederman quipped that the President's December 30th signing
statement was "the commander-in-chief version of 'I had my fingers crossed."' 5
Senator McCain, among others, was not amused.6
* Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law. I thank the Journal's editorial
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workshop at Capital University and a June work-in-progress lunch at the University of
Cincinnati where I vetted earlier versions of this Essay. Finally, I thank Brennan Grayson
for outstanding research assistance and the University of Cincinnati College of Law and the
Harold C. Schott Foundation for generous financial support. Of course, all remaining errors
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' Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes
in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act of 2006,42 U.S.C.A. § 2000dd-0(1) (West
Supp. 2007).
2 Statement on Signing the Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appro-
priations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act of 2006,
41 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1918, 1919 (Dec. 30, 2005).
3 Charlie Savage, Bush Could Bypass New Torture Ban, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 4, 2006,
at Al.
4 See id. (noting that the purpose of the McCain Amendment was to "close every
loophole") (internal quotation marks omitted).
' Rosa Brooks, McCain to Bush: We Are All over You, TULSA WORLD, Jan. 15, 2006,
at G3.
6 See Charlie Savage, 3 GOP Senators Blast Bush Bid to Bypass Torture Ban, BOSTON
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Four months later, the signing statement again made front page news (and was
the focus of myriad op-ed pieces) after Charlie Savage published an extended article
in The Boston Globe chronicling President Bush's apparently unprecedented use of
constitutional signing statements.7 In June, American Bar Association (ABA) President
Michael Greco appointed a bipartisan, blue ribbon task force to review and report
on the matter, which it in turn did near the end of July.8 In the meantime, the Senate
Judiciary Committee held a hearing at which the administration's use of signing
statements was attacked by Republican and Democratic senators alike.9 Then, in the
immediate wake of the release of the ABA Task Force Report," the Chair of the Senate
Judiciary Committee, Arlen Specter, took to the Senate floor to introduce a bill (Senate
Bill 3731) entitled the Presidential Signing Statements Act of 2006. "
Both the ABA Task Force's recommendations and Senator Specter's bill had as
their centerpiece congressional creation of a cause of action for a federal court's declara-
toryj udgment concerning the legal validity of future presidential signing statements. 2
The ABA Task Force Report, crafted by a bipartisan committee, proved contentious in
a most bipartisan manner, drawing fire from not only the administration's stalwart
allies but from its critics as well.' 3 Although Senate Bill 3731 died with the 109th
GLOBE, Jan. 5, 2006, at A3.
7 Charlie Savage, Bush Challenges Hundreds of Laws, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 30, 2006,
at Al. This essay focuses on constitutional signing statements, in which the President asserts
that one or more provisions of a bill just signed into law are constitutionally problematic and
will therefore be ignored or construed narrowly to avoid the constitutional problem. For an
excellent overview of this subject, see Dawn E. Johnsen, Presidential Non-Enforcement of
Constitutionally Objectionable Statutes, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2000, at
7. Constitutional signing statements are to be distinguished from rhetorical signing statements
and interpretative signing statements. See Christopher S. Kelley, The Unitary Executive and the
Presidential Signing Statement 45 (2003) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Miami University),
available at http://www.ohiolink.edu/etd/view.cgi?niiami 1057716977; see also The Legal
Significance of Presidential Signing Statements, 17 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 131, 131 (1993)
(distinguishing among different uses of presidential signing statements).
8 See Charlie Savage, Panel Chides Bush on Bypassing Laws, BOSTON GLOBE, July 24,
2006, at Al; Mark Silva, ABA Panel Urges Checks on Bush Power, CHI. TRIB., July 24,
2006, at 1.
9 See, e.g., Senators Charge Bush with Disregarding Laws in Name of Security, ST.
Louis POST-DISPATCH, June 27, 2006, at A2.
'o See AM. BAR ASs'N, TASK FORCE ON PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS AND THE
SEPARATION OFPOWERS DOCTRINE (2006), available at http://abanet.org/op/signingstatements/
abafinal-signing-statements-recommendation-report_7-24-06.pdf.
" See S. 3731,109th Cong. (2006); 152 CONG. REC. S8271-72 (daily ed. July 26,2006)
(statement of Sen. Specter).
12 S. 3731 § 5; AM. BAR ASS'N, supra note 10, at 1.
'3 See, e.g., Walter Dellinger, Op-Ed., A Slip of the Pen, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2006, at A 17;
Laurence H. Tribe, 'Signing Statements' Are a Phantom Target, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 9,
2006, at A9.
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Congress, Senator Specter reintroduced a revised version of the bill during the 110th
congressional session.14 But the debate to date has largely side-stepped the wisdom
of the proposed resort to federal judicial declaration. Indeed, the successful push in
August 2006 at the ABA's annual meeting to amend the resolutions the Task Force
proposed, prior to their adoption by the ABA's House of Delegates, left the fifth reso-
lution undisturbed. 15 That resolution called upon Congress to authorize suits for
declaratory judgments on the legal validity of future signing statements. 16
This Essay argues, however, that the proposed legislation would be ill-advised and
counter-productive. Worse, it would exacerbate the underlying institutional infirmities
that have brought us to the present precipice. The inclination to facilitate immediate
resort to the judiciary for resolution of a dispute between the political branches about
the President's constitutional obligations is premised on an unidentified, unjustified
(and in my view unjustifiable) assumption about the relative roles of Congress and the
Court. Specifically, the fifth ABA resolution and Senate Bill 3731 share the premise
that the Court, rather than Congress, is responsible for ensuring that the President
remains subject to the rule of law.17
This premise has matters backwards. Congress hasfar greater competence and
legitimacy than do the courts to undertake the awesome task of compelling presidential
compliance with the Constitution and laws of the United States. It is the judicial role
in so doing that can be best understood as incidental and sharply circumscribed by con-
cers about competence and legitimacy. Indeed, absent long-standing congressional
neglect of its many powerful tools for disciplining the executive branch, routine and
open presidential assertions of the intent to disregard statutory provisions just signed
into law would be all but inconceivable. Were Congress to act on the fifth ABA reso-
lution, the resulting legislation would further entrench this congressional neglect and
atrophy the congressional muscles alone capable of resisting a truly lawless President.
Ironically, the unintended but most significant long term consequence of the fifth ABA
resolution would be to make all the more likely the kind of presidential usurpation of
the lawmaking function that the ABA Task Force Report warned against.
I. CONGRESS'S "TAKE CARE" CLAWS
Alexander Hamilton observed that the federal courts "have neither FORCE nor
WILL, but merely judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive
arm even for the efficacy of [their] judgments."'18 Or as President Andrew Jackson
'4 S. 1747, 110th Cong. (2007).
1 Ronald A. Cass & Peter L. Strauss, Presidential Signing Statements I, ADMIN. & REG.
L. NEWS, Winter 2007, at 2 (describing House of Delegates revision of resolutions proposed
by the Task Force).
16 See AM. BAR ASS'N, supra note 10, at 1.
'" See id.; S. 3731.
18 THE FEDERAUST No. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961);
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allegedly retorted with regard to the Court's decision in Worcester v. Georgia,9 Chief
Justice "John Marshall has made his decision, now let him enforce it."'20 Unlike the
judiciary, however, Congress has its own mechanisms for coercion. Most prominently,
the Constitution's Framers counterpoised the powers of the purse and the sword in the
legislative and executive branches respectively. 2' But Congress has numerous tools
in addition to control over appropriations to bring a wayward chief executive to heel.
First, Congress enjoys an investigative authority at least as extensive as its leg-
islative authority. Though the adversarial method effectively limits the judge to a
passive, referee role, Congress's power to inform itself (and the country) is inquisi-
torial and, therefore, active. Rooted in seventeenth-century British Parliamentary prac-
tice, Congress first asserted its power to compel the production of relevant testimony
and documentation in its 1792 inquiry into General St. Clair' s failed military expedition
to the Northwest territory.22 In the intervening centuries, numerous Court rulings have
established beyond peradventure that "although there is no express provision of the
Constitution which specifically authorizes the Congress to conduct investigations and
take testimony.., the investigatory power of Congress is so essential to the legislative
function as to be implicit in the general vesting of legislative power in Congress.
23
It is firmly established that Congress's inquisitorial power is at its zenith when probing
"charges of misfeasance and nonfeasance" in the executive branch.24 The Constitution
clearly commits to Congress the task of ferreting out presidential disregard of the laws.
The threat of politically costly exposure alone provides Congress with an important
weapon for deterring presidential lawlessness. Should that deterrent fail, however,
see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Executive Power and the Political Constitution, 2007 UTAH
L. REV. 1, 22 (noting that "[blecause the judicial branch possesses no brute power to compel
obedience to its judgments, if its orders are to be enforced, the enforcement must come from
elsewhere" and that "the ultimate authority to enforce the Constitution against the President
necessarily, inescapably resides in Congress").
19 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
20 Fallon, supra note 18, at 8-9. On the apocryphal nature of the statement commonly
attributed to Jackson, see Joseph C. Burke, The Cherokee Cases: A Study in Law, Politics, and
Morality, 21 STAN. L. REV. 500, 524-25 (1969).
2 1 THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 18, at 465.
22 See DAVID P. CuRRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD, 1789-
1801, at 163-64 (1997); TELFORD TAYLOR, GRAND INQUEST: THE STORY OF CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATIONS 7,24 (1955). See generally M. NELSON McGEARY, THE DEVELOPMENTS OF
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIVE POWER (1940) (discussing congressional investigations in the
early twentieth century).
23 MORTON ROSENBERG, INVESTIGATIVE OVERSIGHT: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW,
PRACTICEAND PROCEDURE OFCONGRESSIONALINQUIRY 3 (2003); see, e.g., Eastland v. U.S.
Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 504 (1975); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187
(1957); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 137 (1927).
24 McGrain, 273 U.S. at 151. See generally ROSENBERG, supra note 23, at 4-5 (discussing
origins of Congress's inquisitorial power).
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Congress has an almost limitless capacity to pressure a reluctant President to do his
constitutional duty to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed. 2 5 Impeach-
ment constitutes the ultimate congressional discipline on the executive and judicial
branches.26 But far less draconian measures are available as well. In addition to with-
holding appropriations, 27 Congress can decline to (1) re-authorize executive depart-
ments, agencies, or programs; (2) confirm presidential appointments; (3) ratify treaties;
or (4) take action on the President's legislative agenda.28 In each case, because con-
gressional inaction is sufficient to burden the incumbent administration, a minority
in a single house of Congress may hold the President's program hostage, provided
it controls at least one of the "veto gates" through which the desired congressional
action must pass.2 9 As Professor Michael Paulsen colorfully observed, "[iun a
25 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
26 To be sure, as historian Clinton Rossiter observed nearly half a century ago, "[t]he
power of impeachment is the 'extreme medicine' of the Constitution, so extreme... that most
observers now agree with Jefferson that it is a 'mere scarecrow' and with Henry Jones Ford
that it is a 'rusted blunderbuss, that will probably never be taken in hand again."' CLINTON
ROSSITER, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 52 (2d ed. 1960). Even so, Professor Rossiter stressed
that "rusted though the blunderbuss may be, it still endures, stacked away defiantly in the
Constitution" and awaiting use if necessary. Id. at 53.
27 It is commonplace that "[t]he power of the purse is among Congress's most potent
weapons in its effort to control the execution of the laws." Jack M. Beermann, Congressional
Administration, 43 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 61, 84 (2006). Controversy exists about the extent to
which modem Congresses can or will make aggressive use of this power, however. Compare
Louis Fisher, Congressional Abdication: War and Spending Powers, 43 ST. Louis U. L.J.
931,932 (1999) (concluding that "from World War II to the present, Congress has repeatedly
abdicated fundamental.., spending powers to the President"), and ROSSrrER, supra note 26,
at 51 (wryly noting that "[i]nstances in which Congress slapped a President, and hurt him, by
withholding funds from schemes in which he had an intense personal interest do not come to
mind in bunches"), with D. RODERICK KIEWiET & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE LOGIC OF
DELEGATION: CONGRESSIONAL PARTIES AND THE APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS 184-85 (1991)
(asserting that Congress plays a significantly greater role in the appropriations process than
some critics have argued), and Neal Devins, Abdication by Another Name: An Ode to Lou
Fisher, 19 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 65, 74 (2000) ("Congress very much cares about its power
to reward constituents through appropriations.").
28 See generally WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES AND THE POLICY
PROCESS 297-303 (6th ed. 2004) (discussing authorization, appropriations, and confirmation
as mechanisms for effecting congressional oversight); ROSSrTER, supra note 26, at 49-56
(discussing congressional powers capable of constraining the President).
29 See McNollgast, Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in Statutory
Interpretation, LAW &CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 1994, at 3,7 (naming the numerous
choke points in the legislative process "veto gates"); see also ROSSITER, supra note 26, at 54
("The real power of Congress to check or persuade a President lies in none of [its] positive
weapons. . . ,for the real power of Congress over him is essentially negative in character"-
i.e., the power to refuse to cooperate with the President's agenda). In addition to the capacity
to leverage the powers catalogued in Article I are the more informal mechanisms for congres-
sional oversight of the executive branch that emerged over the centuries to fill the constitutional
2007]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
bare-knuckled brawl, Congress can reduce the President to little more than a
bureaucrat drawing a fixed salary, vetoing bills, granting pardons, and receiving
foreign ambassadors-but without funds for hosting a state dinner (or even taking
the ambassador to McDonald's)."3
To be sure, the President has his own, powerful mechanisms to force congres-
sional action. Moreover, recalcitrant congressional opposition can have its own,
profound political costs, as the anti-Republican backlash to the 1995 governmental
shutdowns demonstrated.3 Tailoring the congressional punishment to the scope and
severity of the presidential crime and then publicly making the case for such resis-
tance, requires the very best political judgment and skill. But where ought we look
for our most talented politicians if not in the halls of Congress?
Congress also enjoys a far greater political legitimacy than do the federal courts.
As the people's representatives in a republic, members of Congress are free to challenge
the wisdom of an underlying presidential policy distorting the interpretation or frustrat-
ing the execution of existing statutes. As an appointed judiciary accorded life tenure,
the federal courts refrain from open, policy-based disagreements with either of the polit-
ical branches. An informal, but nonetheless controlling, norm forbids jurists from
defending theirjudgments with extrajudicial commentary; congressmen, notjudges,
frequent the media circuits. Moreover, federal judges are vulnerable to credible charges
of naivet6, disengagement, and obsolescence.3" As past confrontations demonstrate,
the judiciary is ill-suited to stand against a resolute, popular President, especially
in a time of perceived crisis.33 It is worth recalling the verdict of the distinguished
interstices. See OLESZEK, supra note 28, at 299 (observing that "executive officials are rou-
tinely in frequent contact with committee members and staff' and "[sluch informal contacts
enable committees to exercise policy influence in areas in which statutory methods might be
inappropriate or ineffective"; and opining that "[ilnformal methods of program review are
probably the most prevalent techniques of oversight"); RosSrrER, supra note 26, at 51 (noting
"the vast web of informal contacts and friendships and understandings between the old hands
in Congress and the old hands in the civil service, . . . which are rarely publicized [and] are
maintained in blithesome disregard of the stated policies of the President-but he, after all,
is only passing through").
30 Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What
the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 322 (1994); see also RossrrER, supra note 26, at 56 (reminding
the reader "of the President's reliance on Congress for support of even his most splendid
prerogatives").
3' For discerning, if one-sided, descriptions of the political fallout from the 1995 federal
budget stand-off, see BILL CLINTON, MY LIFE 682-83, 695 (2004).
32 See Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: The
Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333, 348 (1998) (observing that during the
New Deal, the Supreme Court "was criticized for being behind the times... and the Court and
its members were even subjected to open ridicule" (citations omitted)).
33 See, e.g., Dennis J. Hutchinson, "The Achilles Heel" of the Constitution: Justice Jackson
and the Japanese Exclusion Cases, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 455, 489-90 (discussing Justice
Jackson's doubts about the Court's ability to compel the President to abandon the Japanese
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historian, Professor Clinton Rossiter, who wrote: "We delude ourselves cruelly if we
count on the Court at all hopefully to save us from the consequences of most abuses of
presidential power."34 The judiciary, he concluded, provides "one of the least reliable
restraints on presidential activity," and whatever "restricting powers" it wields "are
a delusive shadow compared with the sweep of' congressional authority to cabin
presidential overreaching. 35 By accelerating judicial review of presidential signing
statements, the ABA's proposal would place an enormous weight on a slender reed.
In short, Congress enjoys extensive institutional advantages relative to thejudiciary
in any contest against the President. This evident reality makes it puzzling that the ABA
and Senator Specter seekjudicial intervention in lieu of leveraging the many powers
of Congress. In fact, Specter was initially inclined to pursue such a course. A month
before he introduced Senate Bill 3731, he speculated that the Senate might constrain
the President's use of signing statements by connecting the issue to "the confirmation
process or budgetary matters. 36 But since the ABA Task Force issued its report,
Specter focused instead on devising a mechanism whereby Congress could sue the
President.37 In this way, the false hope of a judicial salvation has already diverted
one pivotal senator's efforts away from a potentially more effective response.
More importantly, this shift is a microcosm of the more general effect the proposed
legislation would have if enacted. However inferior to Congress the judiciary may be
in terms of its capacity to govem Presidents, the balance between the political branches
would not be much altered so long as Congress continued to exercise its constitu-
tional prerogatives. In that case, the proposed cause of action might be justified as a
supplement to, not a substitute for, congressional oversight. But this defense ignores
the adverse effect lawsuits would have on congressional vigor in superintending the
executive branch. For the reasons developed below, the inhibitory effect of a litigation
option would likely be a dramatic one.
II. OVERSIGHT BY JUDICIARY
Though intended as a supplement, if not also a spark, to congressional oversight,
creation of an action for a declaratory judgment on the validity of signing statements
would likely have the unintended and undesirable effect of supplanting, and thus sti-
fling, Congress's proper role in the matter. The potential availability of an immediate
proceeding promising judicial declaration on the abstract validity of a signing statement
exclusion and internment policies). Indeed, the ABA Task Force Report obliquely acknowl-
edges this reality by announcing that "[iut is to be hoped that the President would obey any
constitutional declaration of the Supreme Court." AM. BAR ASS'N, supra note 10, at 26.
34 RoSSrTER, supra note 26, at 58.
" Id. at 59, 56.
36 See Senators Charge Bush with Disregarding Laws in Name of Security, supra note
9 (quoting Senator Specter).
37 See supra notes 10-11, 13 and accompanying text.
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would do this for numerous reasons.38 It would exacerbate Congress's unfortunate
tendency to neglect its oversight role, risk the perception that Hill proceedings were
aimed at influencing pending cases, muzzle public debate about the underlying policy
controversy, reduce the richness of a political question to the sterility of a legal one,
thrust judges into a politically charged dispute, replace a cooperative and conciliatory
(albeit contentious) effort with an adversarial one, unwittingly vindicate presidential
defiance of the laws, and create a dangerously false sense of constitutional security.
In other words, it seems like a bad idea.
Whether due to political cowardice, fatigue, or disinterest, Congress has often
neglected its oversight function. Indeed, congressional neglect is often cited as the rea-
son an alternative vehicle, such as judicial review, is necessary to secure presidential
compliance with the law.39 But any unfortunate tendency by senators and representa-
tives to disregard this aspect of their constitutional duty would only be aggravated by
the availability of a plausible claim that the dispute was pending judicial resolution.
Though Congress was once earnest in the execution of its independent obligation to
construe the Constitution conscientiously, this sense of constitutional responsibility
has ebbed over the course of the twentieth century as our elected representatives have
increasingly perceived that task as the exclusive province of the courts.' This attitude
38 The rejection of the ABA's proposal would not, of course, exclude the Court from passing
on a constitutional claim embodied in a presidential signing statement, if and when the claim
arose in litigation challenging the legality of governmental action. But this possibility does not
justify privileging judicial determination of these inter-branch clashes above all other consti-
tutional methods for their resolution.
" For example, during the third panel discussion at this symposium, Mark Agrast, a member
of the ABA Task Force, acknowledged that "Congress has a lot of weapons at its disposal; we
wish it would use them." Mark Agrast, Remarks at Panel Id of William & Mary Bill of Rights
Journal Symposium, The Last Word? The Constitutionality of Presidential Signing Statements
21 (Feb. 2,2007) (transcript on file with William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal). He continued:
Failing to use them, certainly unless they show some sign that they're
going to use the power of the purse or any of the other forms of lever-
age they have .... it is really only the courts that are equipped to assess
the validity of decisions by the executive branch, that the Constitution
permits or even compels the President to disregard or decline to enforce
the laws.
Id.; see also id. at 38 ("I don't see even this Congress marshalling the will to take more
aggressive steps.").
4 See Jay S. Bybee, The Tenth Amendment Among the Shadows: On Reading the
Constitution in Plato's Cave, 23 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 551, 570 (2000) (noting "the
conscientious efforts of the members [of the first Congresses], over a broad array of subjects,
to understand the extent and the limits of Congress's authority," then arguing "[b]ut congres-
sional interest in the Constitution waned substantially over the next century, apparently because
members of Congress knew that the Court would cure their constitutional excesses" (citation
omitted)); Abner J. Mikva, How Well Does Congress Support and Defend the Constitution ?,
61 N.C. L. Rev. 587, 587 (1983) ("For the most part, legislative debate does not explore the
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arguably does much to explain the existing lethargy with which Congress confronts
a President's more strained constitutional justifications for declining to enforce pro-
visions in a bill he himself just signed into law. Legislation shifting to the judiciary
the power and duty to superintend executive branch compliance with the laws can be
expected to compound existing congressional constitutional carelessness. Moreover,
in addition to using the pendency ofjudicial proceedings as an excuse for avoidance
of responsibility, genuine questions about the propriety of congressional action on the
subject of a lawsuit might chill any remaining congressional willingness to undertake
the apparently unpalatable task of energetic oversight.4'
This chilling effect will extend beyond Capitol Hill to dampen the ardor of public
debate about the underlying, policy-based controversies. Rather than exercising their
access to, and facility with, media outlets to chastise the President and make the case
for his duty to honor the existing statutes, members of Congress will be tempted to point
to the existence of judicial proceedings as a reason to decline comment. They will
adopt a "wait and see" approach as the litigation works its way toward a final appel-
late court ruling, a process that ordinarily consumes years. Instead of focusing national
attention on the controversy, litigation will reduce rich political questions into dry legal
ones that are less likely the subject of the kind of democratic deliberation essential
to mobilizing opposition to a lawless administration.
Moreover, once litigation commences, neither congressional leaders nor the
President will have much incentive to achieve a compromise settlement that more
truly reflects the position of the median voter. Instead, their respective positions will
harden as they seek a total victory from adversarial litigation. But as a general matter,
the constitutional balance among the political branches is better preserved by a negoti-
ated resolution of differences in which all related matters can be considered together
and the relative intensity of competing commitments can be registered. For the same
reasons that litigation of private disputes is often appropriate only after mediation
efforts have been exhausted, peremptory resort to suit for a declaratory judgment will
frequently interrupt productive inter-branch dialogue that would have, in due course,
achieved a more meaningful and stable settlement than a judicial ruling can be
expected to provide.4"
Ironically, referring to the judiciary a President's assertion of an intent to dis-
regard federal law may serve to legitimate the claim in the eyes of the public even if
the courts ultimately reject it. So long as the President's argument meets the minimum
constitutional implications of pending legislation; and, at best, Congress does an uneven job
of considering the constitutionality of the statutes it adopts.").
41 See Beermann, supra note 27, at 93-99 (discussing separation of powers problems
raised when Congress undertakes action that might be perceived as intended to influence
pending litigation).
42 Cf Carrie Menkel-Meadow, TowardAnother View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure
of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754, 757-59 (1984) (contrasting binary, adversarial,
and problem-solving approaches to dispute resolution).
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good faith threshold customarily required of litigating positions, even the most
outlandish constitutional claim will gain a modicum of respectability. The dispute
between the branches is recast from a presidential refusal to honor the law, or even a
profound disagreement about contending policy objectives, into grounds for an arcane
debate within a specialized segment of the legal profession. The President's moral
obligation to see that the laws be faithfully executed is reduced to, at best, a requirement
to avoid patently frivolous arguments and honor any final adversejudicial decision.
The availability of a routine process for obtaining a judicial ruling on presidential
claims to act in contravention of the law will make such claims appear commonplace
and, therefore, may be expected to increase their regularity. At the same time, when
a President has constitutional reservations to a statutory provision, but doubts the
likelihood of prevailing in litigation, rather than asserting the claim in an effort to
encourage legislative accommodation, he will likely be tempted to keep secret his
decision to resist the provision. By making signing statements the trigger for per-
haps unwanted litigation, the ABA' s proposal may decrease the instances of signing
statements without decreasing the frequency of presidential misconduct.
Finally, and most seriously, the existence of a path to a judicial declaration will
lull both Congress and the public into a misplaced assurance that the courts alone will
be sufficient to police presidential misconduct. The legislative process is everywhere
constrained by acute scarcity of time and resources, and however rare or inadequate
congressional oversight may be today,43 it will be that much rarer and poorer if it is
perceived as unnecessarily duplicating judicial efforts to the same end. As the exer-
cise of the oversight function becomes progressively infrequent, judicial review of
signing statements will become the primary, and eventually the exclusive, mechanism
to keep their use in check. But history teaches that the courts cannot be depended
upon to resist presidential overreaching. Only Congress has the electoral legitimacy,
the self-informative capacity, and the practical machinery to withstand the withering
force of sustained presidential opposition. When faced with the prospect of open defi-
ance of their rulings," the Justices have sought to align themselves with the chief
executive to avoid confrontations they almost certainly would have lost.45 Thus, the
fifth ABA resolution would replace a functional, albeit presently underperforming,
constraint on the President in the form of congressional oversight with a chimerical
43 See generally JOEL D. ABERBACH, KEEPING A WATCHFUL EYE: THE PoLmcs OF
CONGREsSIONALOvERSIGHT (1990) (challenging the assumption that contemporary Congresses
grossly neglect their oversight function); Joel D. Aberbach, What's Happened to the Watchful
Eye, 29 CONG. & PRESIDENCY 3 (2002) (updating the book's analysis).
4 For a discussion of historical "cases of presidential resistance" to judicial rulings, see
Fallon, supra note 18, at 7-10; see also A. Christopher Bryant & Carl Tobias, Quirin Revisited,
2003 Wis. L. REv. 309, 322 (discussing the Justices' awareness that President Roosevelt had
announced an intent to execute Nazi saboteur defendants regardless of how the Court ruled on
their pending appeals).
41 See, e.g., Hutchinson, supra note 33, at 489-90.
[Vol. 16:169
SIGNING STATEMENTS AND CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT
control in the form of an impotent judicial declaration. The rule of law would survive
at the pleasure of the chief executive, and the ABA's proffered remedy would have
facilitated the very ills it was meant to prevent. If, as it seems to many, the structural
Constitution's allocation of authority has been distorted, then that structure needs
study and repair. A superficial fix would only mask the underlying weaknesses as
they grow unchecked.
These pragmatic considerations should weigh heavily against creation of the
proposed cause of action. But ultimately, the proposal is problematic for an even
more fundamental reason. The fifth ABA resolution is predicated on highly contest-
able assumptions about the proper role of the judiciary in our constitutional design
that are nowhere in its report even acknowledged, let alone defended. The remainder
of this Essay first exposes and then challenges these assumptions.
Ill. JUDICIAL EXCLUSIVITY
The ABA Task Force implicitly assumed that the judicial power to say "what the
law is" requires that the judiciary lay exclusive claim to that function. This assumption
explains the odd supposition that a President willing to openly disregard the clear
command of a statute enacted into law under his signature would cease defiance when
confronted with the same words in ajudicial declaration. In a statute, the words are
merely hortatory unless and until incorporated into a declaratory judgment, at which
point they become talismans brooking no presidential opposition, constitutionally
based or otherwise. Whether this accurately predicts potential presidential behavior,
it clearly assigns a pre-eminent role to the courts. This designation of the judiciary as
ultimate arbiter is predicated on the view that "law" is what the courts, not Congress
or the President, say it is.47 Under this conception, judicial supremacy entails more than
the demand that judicial decisions, once rendered, be deemed final.48 Rather, this
more muscular version of judicial supremacy presumes that judicial review provides
both an indispensable checking function on the political branches4 9 and a necessary
4 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
4' But see Louis Fisher, Remarks at Panel IV of William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal
Symposium, The Last Word? The Constitutionality of Presidential Signing Statements 32-33
(Feb. 2, 2007) (transcript on file with William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal) (rejecting the
claim that Marbury stands for the proposition that saying what the law is is the exclusive
province of the judiciary).
48 See Robert Justin Lipkin, Which Constitution? Who Decides?, 28 CARDOZO L. REV.
1055, 1071 (2006) ("Roughly speaking and as a slogan only,judicial review plus finality equals
judicial supremacy.").
49 See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 86 (5th ed. 2005) (noting the
argument that judicial review "rest[s] on the broader ground that the Supreme Court was
accorded a distinctive role as the guarantor of the supremacy of the federal Constitution as
against the states and the federal legislature").
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means for conclusive settlement of discord between them,5" in effect producing what
might more aptly be termed judicial exclusivity5' or judicial sovereignty.52
Nowhere are these views more evident than in the ABA Task Force Report's
treatment of potential Article II impediments to obtaining immediate judicial review
of signing statements. The report laments that "[a]t present, the standing element of
the 'case or controversy' requirement of Article IR of the Constitution frequently frus-
trates any attempt to obtain judicial review of' a presidential signing statement announc-
ing an intent not to enforce or comply with a law. 5' Acknowledging (regrettably?)
that "Congress cannot lessen the case or controversy threshold," the ABA Task Force
nevertheless urged Congress to "dismantle barriers above the constitutional floor."54
In particular, legislation authorizing suit on behalf of Congress-or a house or a member
or an agent thereof-might circumvent these restrictions by allowing a claim of injury
to Congress's lawmaking authority.55 Moreover, both the President and Congress
should advance the cause of judicial resolution of their dispute "by avoiding non-
constitutional arguments like the political question doctrine or prudential standing."56
Were all this to be done, "[iut would be expected that one case before the Supreme
Court would put to rest the constitutionality of a signing statement that announces the
President's intent not to enforce a provision of a law or to do so in a manner contradic-
tory to clear congressional intent. 57 In the eyes of the ABA Task Force, the standing
and political question58 (to make no mention of the ripeness or mootness) doctrines
are awkward irregularities frustrating the need for a judicial pronouncement.
A different view, of course, would be that the these legal doctrines protect core
structural values by circumscribing the role of the judiciary in attempting resolution
of precisely the kinds of highly politicized and policy-sensitive disagreements likely
to be reflected in presidential signing statements. 59 This view, in turn, rests on an
50 See Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Inter-
pretation, 110 HARV. L. REv. 1359, 1371 (1997) (arguing that a strong version of judicial
supremacy is necessary to fulfill the "law's settlement function").
51 See Neal Devins & Louis Fisher, Judicial Exclusivity and Political Instability, 84 VA.
L. REv. 83, 84-85 (1998) (discussing, and resisting, the arguments for judicial exclusivity
in interpretation of the Constitution).
52 See Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000 Term: Foreword: We The Court, 115
HARV. L. REv. 4, 13 (2001) ("There is... a world of difference between having the last word
and having the only word: between judicial supremacy and judicial sovereignty.").
53 AM. BAR Ass'N, supra note 10, at 25.
54 Id.
15 Id. at 25-26.
56 Id. at 26.
57 Id.
58 See generally Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than Court? The Fall of the Political
Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 237 (2002)
(discussing the decline of the political question doctrine).
59 Cf ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT
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alternative understanding of the judicial role under our Constitution. The judicial
power to say "what the law is" is indispensable only because it is incidental to the
judiciary's central task of resolving discreet disputes in accord with the law. The
Supreme Court was required to rule on the constitutionality of section thirteen of
the Judiciary Act because that question was itself a component of the inquiry into
whether Mr. Marbury was entitled to that Court's order granting him his undelivered
commission.' The Court did not entertain Mr. Marbury' s suit in order to permit it to
rule on the constitutionality of the Judiciary Act. If Mr. Marbury goes away, so too
does the Court's law-announcing function. The ABA Task Force, however, treats the
latter function as an end in its own right. In doing so, the ABA probably acts in con-
formity with the assumptions of most of its present-day constituents.6 ' But even so,
it ignores a substantial and compelling minority position to the effect that it is just as
emphatically the power and duty of the President and Congress to say "what the law
is.''62 Indeed, this debate has perhaps never before been joined so vigorously as it
has been in recent academic literature,63 making the ABA Task Force's neglect of
the subject all the more surprising. More importantly, this minority view has the
significant advantage of fitting far better with the language and history of Marbury64
and, indeed, of the Constitution itself.
CONCLUSION
The ABA Task Force correctly characterizes recent use of presidential signing
statements as a threat to the rule of law.65 Unfortunately, its proposed remedy would
AT THE BAR OF POLrICS (2nd ed. 1962) (explaining the uneasy intersection between politics
and the Court).
60 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 172 (1803).
61 See Kramer, supra note 52, at 6-7 (asserting that "as a descriptive matter, judges,
lawyers, politicians, and the general public today accept the principle of judicial supremacy-
indeed, they assume it as a matter of course"); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Irrepressible Myth
ofMarbury, 101 MICH. L. REv. 2706, 2706-07 (2003) (describing the prevalent assumption
of judicial supremacy in constitutional interpretation).
62 See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 47, at 32-33; Paulsen, supra note 30, at 221.
63 See Dawn E. Johnsen, Functional Departmentalism and Nonjudicial Interpretation:
Who Determines Constitutional Meaning?, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 2004, at 105
("One of the vibrant constitutional debates at the turn of the twenty-first century concerns
enduring questions about the appropriate role of nonjudicial entities-especially Congress
and the President-in the development of constitutional meaning."); see, e.g., LARRY D.
KRAMER, THE PEOPLETHEMSELVES (2004); Kramer, supra note 52; Symposium, The People
Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Review, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 809
(2006); Symposium, Theories of Taking the Constitution Seriously Outside the Courts, 73
FORDHAM, L. REv. 1341 (2005).
' See Paulsen, supra note 61, at 2710 (arguing that Marbury "cannot bear a judicial
supremacist reading").
6 But see Curtis A. Bradley & Eric A. Posner, Presidential Signing Statements and
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enhance the danger. Creation of a legal cause of action to challenge the claims made
in a presidential signing statement is both unnecessary, as Congress is well equipped
to respond on its own behalf, and positively harmful, as it would likely dampen
congressional vigor.
Constitutions and statutes are, of their own force, merely words on paper. The
U.S. Constitution's Framers doubted the ability of mere parchment protections to
preserve liberty.66 As Professor Rossiter remarked, "paper limitations, even those
in the Constitution, need the support of living people and going institutions if they
are to be of any force. 67 Only ambition will check ambition, and the primary check on
a lawless administration must be ambitious, and therefore bold, members of Congress.
To be sure, in recent decades Congress has arguably failed to fulfill its oversight
function. If so, then sustained inquiry into the causes and possible remedies for this
neglect should be our focus (and should have played a greater role in the ABA Task
Force's study). To instead place our reliance on the courts at once accords the judiciary
a power far exceeding its just claims to legitimacy and also demands of it a fortitude
far exceeding what its composition should lead us to expect.
After Archibald Cox was fired as the Watergate special prosecutor, he issued a
one-sentence press release reading: "Whether ours shall continue to be a government
of laws and not of men is now for Congress and ultimately the American people.,
68
What was true then is no less so today.
Executive Power, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 307, 310 (2006) (finding "[tihe attack on the
institution of signing statements [to be] puzzling").
66 See Mark A. Graber, Enumeration and Other Constitutional Strategies for Protecting
Rights: The View From 1787/1791, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 357, 362-63 (2007).
67 ROSSITER, supra note 26, at 49.
68 See KENGORMLEY, ARCHIBALDCOX: CONSCIENCEOFANATION 358 (1997); cf Fallon,
supra note 18, at 22-23.
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